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ii

ARGUMENT
The reply brief of Appellant / Cross- Appellee, i4, did not use headings to
denote exactly which of Robertson's Cross-appeal arguments it was responding to.
Robertson's believes, however, it was in the order set forth below:
I.

The Existence of The Express Contract Precludes Recovery For
Unjust Enrichment.

On cross-appeal, Robertson's first argument was that unjust enrichment
could not apply because an express contract addressed the subject matter of the
claim. In reply, i4 apparently does not dispute this well-established principle. See
i4 Reply Brief p.p. 11-13. Instead, i4 argues simply that' [this] Court must 'afford
broad discretion to the trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the
facts.'" Id. p. 11, quoting Desert Miriah Inc. v.B&I

Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83 \ 9

While that is a correct general statement, such "broad discretion" does not
allow a trial court to "ignore existing principles of law in favor of its view of the
equities." Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah C t. App. 1992). In Desert
Miriah, which i4 relies on, the Utah Supreme Court noteq that "the doctrine of
unjust enrichment was specifically developed to address situations 'that did not fit
within a particular legal standard but which nonetheless njerited judicial
intervention.'" Desert Miriah, 2000 UT 83, |12, quotinglState v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 1244 - 45 (Utah 1994). Contract is just such a particular legal standard and
the existence of a contract is a bar to recovery for unjust ejnrichment. That was
1

and still is the law in Utah. See TruGreen Cos., L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers, 2008
UT 81, f 18 (a recent case, noting that restitution and unjust enrichment sound in
quantum meruit and "are used only when no express contract is present").
II.

The Factual Findings Do Not Support The Legal Conclusion That
Robertson's Was Unjustly Enriched.

Robertson's third argument on cross-appeal was that the factual findings did
not support the legal conclusion that Robertson's was unjustly enriched. In its
reply, i4 takes Robertson's argument as "attacking the factual findings of the trial
court." i4 Reply Brief p.p. 11-12. Accordingly, i4 claims the proper standard of
review should be clear error rather than correctness. But "[qjuestions about the
legal adequacy of findings of fact and the legal accuracy of the trial court's
statements present issues of law, which [Utah appellate courts] review for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court.'" Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian,
2006 UT App 165, P 8, 135 P.3d 904 (quoting Shar's Cars, LLC v. Elder, 2004
UT App 258, P 12, 97 P.3d 724), cert, denied, 150 P.3d 58 (Utah 2006).
Apparently i4 simply misses the forest for the trees. i4 is correct that
Robertson's pointed out areas where the trial court might have difficulty making
certain factual findings. But the main point was that those certain factual findings
just were not made. For example, Robertson's argued there was no specific
finding that Robertson's received a benefit. It then pointed out that such a finding
would be hard to make because among other things, the website had not been
2

completed and there was no evidence or finding that i4 h^d given Robertson's the
password to actually use the website.
The point, however, was not that the trial court could not make a finding
that Robertson's had been given the password or a finished website, but that it the
trial court did not make such findings. Thus, the issue was not the difficulty, but
the omission of a factual finding needed to support a claim for unjust enrichment.
Absent Robertson's actually having received a working website and password to
work it, it is questionable at best whether the unjust enrichment is a proper legal
conclusion that can follow. Certainly however, some kind of finding of that
nature is required, but it was not made.
In its reply brief, i4 cites Parduhn v Bennett, for the proposition that it is
enough if the findings are "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached." i4
Reply Brief p. 11 citing Parduhn, 2005 UT 22, f24. Then i4 argues that "the
findings here are sufficiently detailed." Yet nowhere does i4 direct this Court to
such a detailed finding. As Robertson's pointed out initially, there was no specific
finding that Robertson's had accepted or retained the benefit of the website.
Indeed, even at the time of trial, which was much later, the website was not
complete, hence the trial court's directive that i4 should tender remaining rights

3

and access to the website to Robertson's. l This is inconsistent with a finding that
Robertson's had already been conferred a benefit. In short, there simply was no
finding that Robertson's had accepted or retained a benefit and i4 still does not
direct the Court to such a finding.
Similarly, there was no finding that Robertson's appreciated or had
knowledge of the benefit because, although Robertson's knew there was a website
being created, Robertson's did not know it was finished - for the simple reason
that it wasn't, if nothing else. Similarly, Robertson's could not independently
access the website absent a password and there was no finding that Robertson's
had that password. In short, the findings of fact are simply insufficient to
conclude that Robertson's was unjustly enriched.
III.

Robertson's Should Be Awarded Attorney Fees Because i4fs
Appeal Is Based on the Contract, Which Provides for Fees.

As if zen-like repetition will make it true, i4 continues to reiterate its claim
that it prevailed on its contract claim at trial. Thus, at page 12 of its Reply Brief,
i4 argues "this Court should recognize the legal consequence of the trial court's
factual determinations, which legal consequence is that i4 Solutions won its
breach of contract claim and is entitled to attorney fees." i4 Reply Brief p. 12.
But i4's insistence only drives Robertson's point home with more force - the
l

See trial court's minute entry decision, which ordered i4 to take any further steps
necessary to tender all rights and access to the website to Robertson's. R. 235, 277
4

attorney fee provision of the contract is all that i4fs appeal can be based on. See
generally: id, p. 5 (claiming i4 prevailed under any theory); id, p. 7 (i4 would be
prevailing party under the contract even if it had recovered nothing); id, p.7 (i4 is
"still the prevailing party under the contract"); id. p.9 (i4 "was the prevailing
party and Robertson was found to have breached the contract by the plain
language of the trial court's findings of fact").
Necessarily, i4 must make such claims because it is well-established that to
recover attorney fees based on the contractual provision, the recovery must be
based on that contract. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah
1986). But because the attorney fee provision of the contract is all that i4Ts appeal
can be based on, and i4's reiteration of its success on its contract claim is simply
wrong, Robertson's should be awarded its attorney fees on this appeal.
That is because on i4fs appeal we are really before the Utah Court of
Appeals on only one issue - the propriety of an award of Attorney fees under that
contract.2 Essentially, i4 argues alternatively that the trial court did rule that i4
prevailed in contract or that the trial court should have ruled that i4 prevailed in
contract. In either event, if i4 were to be successful on its appeal, it would be
granted attorney fees for the appeal (and the trial below). By the same token,
2

As noted in its initial brief, appeal wasn't warranted because the amount at
issue was small and no overarching legal issue was involved. Once i4 noticed its
appeal, however, Robertson's was involved in the appellate process anyway.

however, if it is not successful in its quest for such fees here, Robertson's should
be awarded its fees for this appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted on that
very issue:
If plaintiff is required to defend its position on appeal at its own
expense plaintiffs rights under the contract are thereby diminished.
We therefore adopt the rule of law that a provision for payment of
attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to
enforce the contract...
MgmtServs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d406, 409 (Utah 1980).
i4fs appeal is nothing more than an action brought, on appeal to enforce the
contract as to its attorney fee provision. But i4 fails on appeal because its position
necessarily requires findings that Robertson's breached or that i4 prevailed on its
contract claim. If i4fs position is that those findings exist, it does not direct this
Court to them, because the court below did not make them. Moreover, the record
shows that the trial court specifically denied i4fs post-trial requests for a finding
that i4 prevailed on its contract claim. The inescapable conclusion is that the trial
court did not find i4 to have prevailed in contract.
However, the trial court did rule in favor of i4 based on unjust enrichment
and so it directed i4 to prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law. If i4
felt that the trial court should have found that Robertson's breached, it was i4fs
duty on appeal to marshal the evidence against its position and show that, despite
that evidence, the trial court should have found Robertson's breached. i4 has not
6

done so and so its appeal fails on that point also.
Nor can i4 complain about insufficient findings. i4 itself failed to include
those necessary findings in the findings it submitted to the! trial court. It would be
an error invited by i4's own act and barred under the invited error doctrine. "The
invited error doctrine prohibits parties from 'taking advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error/"
Newman v. Write Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79, f 14 (Utah 2008) quoting
Tschaggeny v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37, ^f 12. If 14 tijily felt that the trial
i

court meant to rule that i4 prevailed on a contract theory (despite the trial court's
explicit ruling to the contrary), it was incumbent on i4 to prepare findings of fact
that would support that theory. This would have included a finding that
Robertson's breached the contract and perhaps an ultimate finding that i4
prevailed in contract. i4, however, did not do that either. Having failed to prepare
the findings i4 now complains of - the very error it created - |i4's appeal must fail
under the doctrine of invited error.
CONCLUSION
The only issue raised by i4 is attorney fees due under the contract.
However, i4fs appeal fails because the trial court did not find that i4 prevailed in
contract and, indeed, explicitly refused to make such a fmdin

In such a case,

proper interpretation of statute, case law and sound policy dictate that Robertson's
7

and similar parties should be awarded attorney fees as a prevailing party on
appeal.
/•*»
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(8
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